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State Insurance Takeover Acts: A Constitutional
Analysis After Edgar v. MITE
State legislatures have adopted corporate takeover acts to supplement pro-
tection afforded by the federal Williams Act' to investors confronted with
a tender offer. In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,' the Supreme Court found the Illinois
takeover statute unconstitutional under the commerce clause. 3 A five justice
majority held that the burdens on commerce imposed by the Illinois Act's
ability to delay a tender offer outweighed the state's interest in protecting
resident shareholders and regulating Illinois corporations. Members of the
Court's majority, however, also formed pluralities to find the act unconstitu-
tional under two additional grounds: preemption and direct restraint on com-
merce. Consequently, the constitutional scope of the Edgar decision appears
unclear.
Implicit in all three grounds of unconstitutionality discussed in the Edgar
opinion is a congressional policy favoring a dominant federal interest in a
national securities market. In relying upon this congressional characterization
of the tender offer activity to invalidate the state's encroachment into the
national securities field, the Edgar Court created an almost insurmountable
constitutional barrier to the state regulation of tender offers.
Edgar leaves uncertain the constitutionality of state insurance takeover acts.
The insurance statutes differ from the general acts in that they protect not
only stock owners, but also policyholders during a tender offer for insurance
company stock. By drawing the constitutional parameters set by the Edgar
opinion and applying these boundaries to insurance takeover regulation, this
Note concludes that state insurance takeover acts are unconstitutional.
In Part I this Note discusses the advent of corporate acquisitions through
tender offers and examines the distinctions among the three levels of takeover
regulation. Part II offers a constitutional analysis of Edgar v. MITE, reveal-
ing the congressional policy underlying all three grounds of unconstitution-
ality. Part III applies this analysis to insurance takeover regulation, hypothesiz-
ing that although Congress permits the states to regulate the "business of
insurance" in the McCarran-Ferguson Act," the federal statute fails to establish
any congressional directive necessary to exclude state regulation of insurance
company securities from the national market concept. Consequently, the in-
surance statutes do not survive Edgar's pervasive sweep of unconstitutionality.
1. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (amending Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 12-14, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n (1964)) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1976)).
2. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
4. 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976)).
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The 1960's were an age of developing conglomerates. The prosperity of
that decade allowed corporations to maintain large stores of working capital
and retained earnings. Overflowing with liquid assets, corporations expanded
their control and power by undertaking a new form of investment activity:
the acquisition of other corporations through mergers, stock transfers, and
proxy contests. The conglomerate merger explosion of the early to mid 1960's
saw the birth of a new method for acquiring corporate control, the tender
offer.5 During the past two decades, tender offers have become a popular
method for gaining control of corporations.'
Because of the insurance industry's large reservoir of liquid assets and the
depressed price of insurance stocks, insurance companies became one of the
more attractive targets in the tender offer phenomenon, especially in the late
1960's.7 Conglomerates acquired both life and property liability insurers to
gain liquid capital from insurance premiums and investments. This con-
glomerate activity was coupled with insurance companies forming or becoming
part of holding company systems in attempts to better use their large pools
of liquid assets. Thus, the insurance industry exposed itself to the tender
offer/takeover mania.
5. Generally, a tender offer may be defined as a public offer by an individual, group, or
corporation (raider or offeror), to buy a block of or all securities of a publicly held corporation
(target) for a fixed price during a fixed period of time. The offeror solicits target corporation
shareholders directly, offering to purchase target stock with cash or securities for a price higher
than its current market value. See Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender
Offers, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 767 n.1 (1971). Bypassed in the tender offer transaction, the
target corporation's management (incumbent) often opposes the takeover attempt out of fear
of being ousted or losing managerial independence once corporate control switches from the
target shareholders to the raiding corporation. Thus, target management sometimes works to
defeat the tender offeror's takeover bid. See generally E. ARANow & H. EINHON, TENDER OFFERS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973); Note, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regula-
tions of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1974).
The Williams Act did not offer a precise definition of "tender offer." Consequently, many
public offer transactions go unregulated by the disclosure and proration requirements of the
federal takeover provision. See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. The lack of defini-
tion has been the source of much litigation. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); and Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In
an attempt to bring precision and certainty to this area, the SEC included a definition of "tender
offer" in Proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(1), Securities Exchange Acts Release No. 16,385 (44 Fed. Reg.
70,349, 70,358) (1979).
6. Foremost among the factors contributing to the increasing popularity of the tender offer
mechanism is that takeovers through tender offers are quicker, less expensive, and more suc-
cessful than through proxy contests. Also, economic conditions of the past two decades have
been conducive to expanded tender offer activity. For a discussion of economic developments
that have made tender offers attractive to acquirors, see Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky
Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L.
689, 727-29 (1982); see generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 65-66; Note, supra
note 5, at 1138-39.
7. See generally Note, The Insurance Holding Company Phenomenon and the Search for
Regulatory Controls, 56 VA. L. REv. 636, 637 (1970). See also Wolke, Curing the Cure-Insurance
Holding Companies, 6 FORUM 95 (1970).
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Securities regulations existing in the 1960's were not applicable to the tender
offer mechanism.' No regulation required the offeror to disclose its identity,
its purpose, or its planned means of implementing the takeover bid. This lack
of regulation meant that the investor confronted with a tender offer had in-
adequate information and insufficient time to make an intelligent investment
decision. 9 Also, there lingered a fear that hostile corporate raiders used the
tender offer mechanism merely to gain control of a solvent company in order
to loot its liquid assets, leaving the target corporation a skeletal remains.10
Federal and state governments reacted to the problem of inadequate regula-
tion of tender offers on three levels.
The Williams Act
Congress enacted the Williams Act" in 1968, for the stated purpose of pro-
tecting investors confronted with takeover and tender offer situations.' 2 Sec-
8. See Note, supra note 5, at 1139.
9. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FuLL DIscL6suRE OF CORPORATE EQUITY
OwNERsmP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BiDs, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1967).
10. Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western,
53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 872, 875 (1978) (citing 113 CONG. REC. 857-58 (1967) and 111 CONG. REC.
28,257-58), see also remarks of Senator Kuchel, one of the Williams Act's sponsors, at 113 CONG.
REc. 9338 (1967) ("But where no information is known about the prospective purchasers or
their plans, the shareholder may be ignorantly participating in the rape of the corporation. Con-
trol and liquidation are often attempted under the secretive guise of the cash tender offers.").
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976). The Williams Act amended the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act by adding sections 13(d) and (e) and sections 14(d), (e), and (f). Section 13(d)
applies to acquisitions of stock in non-tender offer situations, requiring purchasers of more than
5% of registered equity securities to disclose certain information to the SEC and the issuer
of the acquired stock within ten days after the acquisition. The information must include the
purchaser's identity and background, its source of funds, the number of shares the purchaser
presently owns, and the purpose of the purchase, including any plans for significant changes
in the target corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 13(d) applies
to acquisitions through open market transactions or private negotiations. Section 14(d), on the
other hand, regulates situations in which the offeror attempts to convince stock owners to tender
shares by using premium prices, a time limit for the investment decision, and a limited number
of shares purchased on a first tender, first purchase basis. Thus, unlike section 13(d), section
14(d) is aimed at preventing pressure transactions for corporate control during which stock owners
would be afforded very little time and information to make deliberate investment decisions. See
S. REP. No. 550, supra note 9, at 3-4.
12. Disagreement concerning the overall legislative purpose of the Williams Act focuses on
whether Congress intended solely to protect investors or whether its purpose was to strike a
neutral balance between offeror and target management, thus explicitly favoring tender offers
by precluding incumbent management from implementing effective defenses against the takeover.
Legislative history reveals that Congress' primary objective in passing the Williams Act was to
protect investors confronted with a takeover situation or tender offer by providing full disclosure.
See 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2813-14, deriving its stated legislative history from remarks
of the Act's sponsor, Senator Williams, at 113 CONG. Rc. 24,644 (1967); Full Disclosure of
Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S.510 Before the
Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 188 (1967) (during the hearings on Williams' bill, SEC Chairman Cohen stated: "The
principal point is that we are not concerned with assisting or hurting either side. We are con-
cerned with the investor. . . .This is our concern and our only concern."). See also S. REP.
No. 550, supra note 9, at 3-4; Note, supra note 10, at 876.
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tion 14(d)'3 of the Act is the primary mechanism regulating the tender offer
activity.' 4 Section 14(d) requires any person making a tender offer for more
This Note focuses on the tender offer provisions of the Williams Act, particularly section 14(d).
Other substantive provisions of section 14 support the investor protection purpose. Section 14(d)(1)
authorizes the SEC to require offerors to provide additional information if the Commission finds
such additional disclosure "necessary or appropriate in the public interest 6r for the protection
of investor." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). Four other substantive provisions shield stock owners
from quick, pressured decisions, insure fair opportunity to offer the shares, and ensure equal
treatment for all tendering stock owners. These protections include an antifraud provision, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), a shareholder withdrawal option, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976), a pro
rata acceptance rule, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976), and a requirement that any increase in con-
sideration before the offer ends must be paid to all selling shareholders, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7)
(1976).
The concept of neutrality derives from an offeror being permitted to delay the announcement
of the tender offer until the moment the offer is effectuated. See infra text accompanying hote
16. This practice results in no extensive delays in the offer and no advance warning to target
management. The suggestion that neutrality is the purpose of the Act derives from the frequently
cited language of S. REP. No. 550, supra note 9, at 3:
The committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation
either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid.
The bill is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors
while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity
to fairly present their case.
See also GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 n.16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
910 (1971) ("the Act was designed for the benefit of investors and not to tip the balance of
regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person seeking corporate control.").
See also 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967).
As this Note argues below, neutrality between the offeror and incumbent management is not
an objective of the Williams Act, but is simply a means to implement its purpose. See Empirical
Research Report, supra note 6, at 766 (suggesting that neutrality was "merely a by-product which
is not required as long as investors are being protected."). The legislative history suggests that
neutrality between offeror and management was actually a compromise between conflicting views
expressed during congressional debates, one expressing fear that corporate raiders misuse
unregulated takeovers, the other maintaining takeovers are beneficial. See Note, supra note
9, at 876; Empirical Research Project, supra note 6, at 730, 734. The ultimate objective of in-
vestor protection during a potential change in corporate control is implemented by this com-
promise. The Williams Act maintains neutrality over the two groups between which the investor
is caught, the offeror and target management.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b) (1976).
14: Although this Note does not focus upon state or federal regulation of creeping tender
offers, a brief analysis of this acquisition practice serves to draw the distinction between sections
13 and 14 of the Williams Act. Creeping tender offers are pre-offer purchases which deprive
selling shareholders the opportunity to receive a premium for their securities. See E. AAiNow
& H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 17. Courts have held that this practice is not subject to the require-
ments of section 14(d). See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp.
1066, 1073-74 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973). The requirements
of section 13(d), however, apply to the creeping tender offer situation when the aggregate amount
purchased is more than 5% of the total registered securities.
State regulation of creeping tender offers gives the target company and shareholders notice
of a possible tender offer earlier than would section 14(d) of the Williams Act. Consequently,
this regulation would be inconsistent with the concept of neutrality and therefore invalid under
this Note's analysis. When narrowing the analysis to section 13(d), however, state regulation
of pre-offer purchases is consistent with this specific provision's policies and purpose. Section
13(d) was enacted to "require disclosure of information by persons who have acquired a substantial
interest, or increased their interest in the equity securities of a company by a substantial amount,
within a relatively short period of time." GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971)
(citing S. REP. No. 550, supra note 9, at 7). Thus, section 13(d) was intended to alert the public
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than five percent of a class of registered equity securities to disclose certain
information any time prior to or concurrent with the commencement of the
offer. This information must be supplied to both the target corporation's
security holders and management, as well as the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). Content of the disclosure required by section 14(d) includes
the name of the target, the identity and background of the tender offeror,
the source and amount of funds to be used to purchase the securities, and
the purpose of the transaction, including plans to change drastically the struc-
ture or operation of the target, such as takeover and liquidation.'"
Section 14(d) allows an offeror to file this information any time prior to
the first announcement of its offer. As a general practice, however, offerors
do not disclose until the last possible minute before the tender offer takes
effect.' 6 Consequently, section 14(d) strikes a balance among the interests of
three groups. The offeror maintains an advantage of surprise, being able to
plan the transaction secretly and confront the target and its shareholders sud-
denly. The surprise element affords incumbent management limited time to
form defenses countering the takeover attempt."' Finally, the investor con-
fronted with a tender offer has adequate information necessary to make a
rational decision, but is given a limited amount of time to consider the offer.'
General State Takeover Acts
In response to the complaint that the Williams Act did not provide ade-
quate investor protection because of the limited time investors and manage-
ment had to evaluate the tender offer, thirty-seven states enacted more stringent
regulations to supplement the federal legislation. ' The jurisdictional basis for
such authority is founded upon the relationship between the state and the
target corporation. There are four possible connections which combine to create
the relationship: the target is incorporated in the state, the target has its prin-
and shareholders of rapid accumulation of securities which might result in a change in corporate
control and market valuation of the corporation's securities. See Empirical Research Project,
supra note 6, at 731. By warning the market that a tender offer is coming, section 13(d) informs
shareholders not to participate in pre-offer sales. Thus, section 13(d) promotes investor interest
by telling them to retain their shares and wait for a premium price. Arguably, unlike state regulation
of normal tender offer activity, state regulation of creeping tender offers is consistent with the
federal Act's early warning provision.
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b) (1976).
16. See Empirical Research Project, supra note 6, at 732.
17. See E. ARAxow, H. EINmaoR & G. BER.STEiN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPOATE CONTROL 218 (1977) (discussing defense tactics that target management might use
to thwart cash takeover bids); see also Note, supra note 5, at 1136.
18. Arguably, the ten day pro rata provision in the Williams Act forces a tender offer to
remain in effect for at least ten days. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6).(1976). Rules promulgated by the
SEC suggest that the minimum offering period is twenty days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1981).
See E. AANow, H. Exn~oRN & G. BEPU.SEiN, supra note 17, at 218; Empirical Research Pro-
ject, supra note 6, at 733.
19. See E. ARANow, H. EwnHoRN & G. BERLSTEiN, supra note 17, at 218.
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cipal place of business in the state, the target's substantial assets are in the
state, or the target is doing business in the state.2"
State takeover statutes have much the same purpose as the Williams Act:
investor protection. And the two levels of regulation accomplish this purpose
by the same means: disclosure. 2' Two provisions, however, mark the distinc-
tion between the state statutes and the requirements of the Williams Act. First,
unlike concurrent filing permitted by the Williams Act,22 the state regulations
require the offeror to file its intent to make a tender offer with the state and
with the target some ten to sixty days before the offer takes effect. This
premature disclosure to the target corporation creates a waiting period during
which investors purportedly have adequate time to consider the offer. Second,
the states are actively involved in assessing the adequacy and fairness of the
disclosure through a hearing provision in the statutes. The majority of states
delegate to a securities commissioner the discretion to call a hearing in which
the adequacy of the offer is judged. In some states the target corporation
can request that a hearing as to the tender offer be held. The state commis-
sioner must then approve the offer before it can be made.22 The commis-
sioner usually has between thirty to one-hundred and twenty days to conduct
the hearing and make the determination.24 In addition to the jurisdictional
bases of the takeover acts, these two areas create doubt as to the constitu-
tionality of the statutes.
The practical effect of the pre-offer disclosure and hearing requirements
is that the commencing of the tender offer is delayed considerably. Also, target
management is given substantial warning of the upcoming offer.2 This
eliminates from the transaction the keys to successful tender offers: secrecy
and speed. 26 The delay generated by pre-offer disclosure and substantive
hearings provides target management adequate time to try to persuade target
shareholders not to accept the offer. Also, target management is afforded
time to initiate defenses to fight off the takeover bid. 27 Such efforts by in-
20. See Note, supra note 10, at 881.
21. Generally, state takeover statutes require more detailed disclosure about the offeror than
does section 14(d) of the Williams Act. See E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra
note 17, at 212-13. It has been argued that the more extensive disclosure requirement makes
it more difficult to complete the takeover, thus frustrating the policy of neutrality. Arguably,
this effect of the discrepancy between the federal tender offer provision and the state acts would
create a conflict resulting in the preemption of the state statutes. See Empirical Research Project,
supra note 6, at 760-61. This argument for preemption confuses the quantity of disclosure with
the timing of the disclosure. More extensive disclosure beyond the minimum amount required
by section 14(d) would be consistent with the investor protection objective of the Williams Act
and would not upset the neutral balance between the offeror and incumbent management. A
discrepancy of when disclosure is required, however, would tip the balance in favor of incum-
bent management. See infra text accompanying note 49.
22. See Note, supra note 5, at 1147 (discussion comparing concurrent filing and pre-offer
disclosure).
23. For a discussion concerning the validity of state merit review provisions, see infra note 63.
24. See Note, supra note 10, at 882-84.
25. See generally E. APANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 17, at 19-21.
26. See Note, supra note 5, at 1150.
27. See supra note 17, noting that defenses are available to target management.
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cumbent management conceivably result in the tender offer being rejected,
defeated, or challenged by competing offers, thus leading to a bidding war. 28
State Insurance Takeover Acts
Forty-two states have enacted legislation governing the acquisition of in-
surance companies and insurance holding companies through stock purchases
and mergers. 29 Generally, the requirements imposed on an offeror by these
insurance takeover acts parallel those of the general takeover acts.3 0 The
legislative jurisdiction of insurance takeover statutes derives from the authority
of the state to protect and regulate domestic insurers .3 Domestic insurers falling
within the state's regulatory authority include insurance companies organized
under the laws of the state32 or non-domestic insurers authorized to do business
in the state.3"
The state's purpose in regulating the takeovers of domestic insurers is to
protect both the domestic insurer's policyholders and its shareholders, thus
safeguarding the public interest by providing adequate insurance services.3 1
This need for protection stems from the potential for abuse upon target in-
surance companies once the offeror has gained control. Particularly, the
statutes were enacted to prevent an offeror from raiding an insurer's liquid
assets or from turning the insurance operations over to inexperienced manage-
ment. These abuses would result in the insurer's insolvency, leaving
policyholders and creditors unprotected.
The statutory requirements of the insurance takeover regulations support
this dual objective of policyholder and shareholder protection. The offeror
is required to disclose to the state and to the target insurance companies its
intent to make an offer before the offer becomes effective. Also, in this pre-
offer notification the offeror must disclose information concerning its past
business practices, its present financial condition, and its future intentions
regarding the insurer, including plans to liquidate or sell the target corpora-
tion's assets.3 1
Within thirty days of receiving such information, the state insurance com-
missioner is required to hold a public hearing to elicit testimony concerning
28. See E. ARANow, H. EiNnoRN & G. BERIsrE, supra note 17, at 219.
29. The eight states that do not regulate acquisitions of control over domestic insurers are
Hawaii, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Wyoming.
30. See generally Schwing, Insurance Holding Company Regulatory Statutes and Related
Legislation: A Compartive Analysis, 27 FED'N OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 96 (1976).
31. This authority derives from the congressional grant of authority to the states to regulate
the "business of insurance." This federal legislation is discussed extensively infra at text accom-
panying notes 164-96.
32. See Schwing, supra note 30, at 111.
33. See Kennedy, State Insurance Commissioner Involvement in Takeovers of Insurers: An
Overview of Procedures and Some Constitutional Considerations, 17 FORUM 374, 379 (1981).
34. See generally Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HAgv. L. REv.
787, 804-11 (1979).
35. See generally Dedman, Insurance Company Mergers and Acquisitions-Compliance With
State Requirements, 13 FORUM 965, 973-77 (1978).
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the takeover. After deliberating upon the offer and proposed takeover, the
commissioner must decide whether to approve the tender offer. This decision
is based on the acquired insurer's continued ability to write lines of insurance
after the takeover, the insurer's financial stability as measured by the offeror's
financial soundness, the fairness of the offer to the insurer's shareholders
(some statutes provide this protection only for resident shareholders), the
fairness of the plans to liquidate, and the competence of the new
management.36
As with the general takeover statutes, the premature disclosure and hearing
provisions of the insurance takeover acts create considerable delay in the actual
commencement of the offer. This delay affords target management time to
try to block the tender offer, conceivably resulting in an unsuccessful takeover
bid. However, this delay is not the only source for the tender offer's failure.
The state insurance commissioner has the power to withhold approval of the
planned takeover of the domestic insurer. Thus, the state insurance takeover
statutes create two obstacles which the offeror must overcome in acquiring
control of the target insurance company.37
II
In Edgar v. MITE Corp.," the Supreme Court invalidated the Illinois
Business Takeover Act, finding it unconstitutional as an indirect burden on
36. For a discussion of factors taken into consideration by an insurance commissioner in
assessing a tender offer for insurance company stock see Schwing, supra note 30, at 116-17;
Kennedy, supra note 33, at 378-79; Dedman, supra note 35, at 976-77.
37. For a discussion concerning the validity of state "merit review," see infra note 63.
38. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). The Illinois Business Takeover Act was a typical general state takeover
statute with pre-offer disclosure and hearing provisions. See ILL. RE V. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.51
(1979). The Illinois Act required an offeror to disclose to the Secretary of State and the target
company its intent to make a tender offer and the terms of that offer twenty days before the
commencement of the offer. Also, the Secretary of State could, at his discretion, call a hearing
any time during this twenty-day period to assess the adequacy of the information disclosed and
the substantive fairness of the offer's terms. Finally, the Act's protections extended to target
corporations in which Illinois shareholders owned 10% of the equity securities or which met
two of the three conditions: the target had its principal executive office in Illinois, was organized
under Illinois laws, or had at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus in Illinois.
MITE Corporation, a Delaware corporation with its principal office in Connecticut, initiated
a cash tender offer for all the outstanding stock of Chicago Rivet and Machine Company, an
Illinois corporation. MITE complied with the Williams Act, making the proper disclosures by
filing Schedule 14D-1. MITE, however, did not comply with the requirements of the Illinois
Act. Instead, MITE filed an action in the federal District Court of Northern Illinois seeking
a declaratory judgment that the state Act was preempted by the Williams Act and that the Act
violated the commerce clause. MITE sought to enjoin the Secretary of State from enforcing the Act.
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the state from enforcing the
Act against MITE. After MITE commenced its offer, Chicago Rivet made an offer for 40%
of its own shares at a price higher than that offered by MITE. The district court declared that
the Illinois Act was preempted and in violation of the commerce clause, thus preventing enforce-
ment of the Illinois Act against MITE. After negotiating with Chicago Rivet and inspecting that
target's books, MITE decided to retract itg tender offer. The Seventh Circuit upheld the decision
of the district court that some parts of the Illinois Act were unconstitutional on preemption
and commerce clause grounds. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 59:255
INSURANCE TAKEOVERS
interstate commerce under the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church,,Inc.3 9
Despite apparent simplicity in the application of the Pike balancing approach
to assess the effect of a state regulation on interstate commerce, the Edgar
opinion does not allow a clear and simple drawing of the constitutional
parameters applicable to state takeover regulations.4°
It is significant to realize the possible grounds for unconstitutionality dis-
cussed in Edgar and the lineup of the justices on the various grounds. Only
six justices addressed the constitutional arguments. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Rehnquist dissented, finding the issue moot. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Blackmun agreed that the Illinois Act conflicted with the
goals and purposes of the Williams Act and therefore was preempted under
the supremacy clause. A plurality of the Court in Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, O'Connor, and Stevens agreed that the Illinois takeover statute
was a direct restraint on commerce, "interdict[ing] interstate commerce, in-
cluding commerce wholly outside the State.""' Finally, Justice Powell joined
the direct restraint plurality to form a majority which held that the burden-
some economic effects on interstate commerce resulting from Illinois' ability
to block a nationwide tender offer outweighed the putative, state interests:
resident shareholder protection and regulation of the internal affairs of a cor-
poration incorporated under Illinois law. 2
It would be unrealistic to delineate the constitutional scope of the Edgar
decision merely by using the mjority's balancing approach. 3 The fact that
four members of the five-justice majority found the Illinois Act to be a direct
restraint on commerce is significant, especially in light of the observation that
this test has been rejected as "overly conclusive and misleadingly precise"
since the 1930's. 44 And although the balancing of burdens against benefits
approach has been readily employed by the Court to invalidate state regula-
tions, especially during the past six terms," one must go beyond the Edgar
Court's motions to realize the decision's far reaching effect. Each of the possi-
39. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits." Id. at 142.
40. As the Maryland district court stated, "Edgar is not exactly a model of judicial unanimity,
in as much as there are six opinions and seven different viewpoints." Bendix Corp. v. Marlin
Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 526 (D. Md. 1982).
41. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643.
42. See id. at 646-47.
43. In discussing Edgar, Professor Loss stated, "[blut so many flowers bloomed among the
seven opinions ... as to make this case less than definitive." Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 609 (1983).
44. L. TRIBE, AmERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-5 (1978). See also Disanto v. Pennsylvania
273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power,
27 VA. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1940) (discussing that the direct-indirect test is unduly formalistic and
difficult to apply).
45. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 427 (1982).
For a list of recent Supreme Court cases in which state regulations have been invalidated under
the commerce clause, see infra note 86.
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ble grounds of unconstitutionality, preemption, direct restraint on interstate
commerce, and burdens on commerce outweighing state interests, is based
upon a congressional policy in support of a national securities market. Con-
sequently, little constitutional room is left for state regulation of takeovers.
Preemption
The Edgar Analysis
Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
in finding that the Illinois statute was preempted by the Williams Act." While
this part of the Court's decision was neither its holding nor its opinion, its
analysis is crucial to realizing the scope of the Court's commerce clause find-
ing. Justice White embraced a preemption analysis which found that the Illinois
Act frustrated "the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way.", 7
Justice White construed the legislative history behind the Williams Act as
disclosing two congressional purposes in the legislation's enactment: to pro-
tect investors and to strike a neutral balance between incumbent management
and the tender offeror during takeover transactions." The Illinois statute
frustrated this dual purpose in two ways. First, the twenty day precommence-
ment disclosure requirement and the hearing provision frustrated the neutrality
objective of the Williams Act by creating delays. These delays gave incum-
bent management an advantage by generating time during which the manage-
ment could formulate defenses to defeat the tender offer. Second, the hear-
ing provision, which allowed the secretary of state to adjudicate the substan-
tive fairness of the tender offer, clashed with the Williams Act by not allow-
ing investors to make free, autonomous decisions based simply on the infor-
mation disclosed to them. This procedure conflicted with the intent of Con-
gress that investors and target shareholders be free to make their own deci-
sions, no matter how wrong or stupid those decisions might be."
Although "Edgar ... cannot stand for a broad preemption principle under
46. Two justices, Powell and Stevens, explicitly refused to join the supremacy clause analysis,
espousing support for some state regulation of takeovers. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 646-47 (Powell,
J., and Stevens, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 632. Justice White reasoned that Congress did not expressly intend to prohibit
states from regulating takeovers and that there was no conflict between the two acts; i.e., it
was not impossible to comply with either. See id.
48. Congress embraced a policy of "evenhandedness," avoiding giving either side in the takeover
contest any advantage. "Congress sought to protect the investor not only by furnishing him
with the necessary information but also by withholding from management or the bidder any
undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice." Id. at 634.
49. "Investors are protected under the Williams Act through what has been termed a 'market
approach.' The function of the federal legislation is to get information to the investor by allow-
ing both the offeror and the incumbent managers of a target company to present fully their
arguments and then to let the investor decide for himself." MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d
at 492 (quoting the Fifth Circuit in Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279
(5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom, Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)).
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which any state regulation of tender offers would have to be invalidated,"10
the Court's nonreliance upon White's preemption conclusion does not preclude
lower federal courts from using preemption as a basis for striking down other
states' takeover statutes."' And, regardless of the impact the Court's preemp-
tion analysis has on lower federal court decisions, Edgar's treatment of the
preemption issue is integral to determining the entire opinion's constitutional
scope. Because preemption is still a viable ground for finding a takeover statute
invalid, an alternative preemption analysis is proposed.
An Alternative Preemption Analysis
Under the proposed analysis, state takeover acts would be preempted by
the Williams Act under any one of three possible situations.2 First, preemp-
tion would result if it were the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress"
to occupy the field in regulating the activity." Second, if actual and real con-
flict existed between the federal regulation and the state statute so that "com-
pliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,"
preemption would occur." Finally, if the state law "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress," the state law would be preempted.15
As the Edgar preemption analysis correctly noted, there was no actual con-
flict between the Williams Act and the Illinois statute;56 since the Williams
Act allowed an offeror to make its disclosure any time before or concurrent
with the announcement of the offer, compliance with both was possible. 7
Under an occupation of the field analysis, Congress did not express explicit
intent to disallow any state regulation of tender offers and takeovers. The
Act's legislative history gives no indication that Congress was even aware of
the state takeover statute concept when it enacted the federal Act. 8 Further-
more, in enacting the Williams Act, Congress did not amend section 28(a)
of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act 9 which provides, "[n]othing in this
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency
or officer performing like functions) of any state over any security or any
50. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1036 (1st Cir. 1982).
51. See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982)
(Maryland takeover law was held unconstitutional under the supremacy clause because the pre-
offer notification and hearing provisions conflicted with the Williams Act by giving incumbent
management an advantage in the tender offer transaction). See also National City Lines, Inc.
v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
52. See generally Note, Preemption and the Constitutionality of State Tender Offer Legisla-
tion, 54 NOTRE DAm LAW. 725 (1979).
53. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
54. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
55. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
56. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 632.
57. See supra text accompanying note 54.
58. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 631 n.6.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder." 6 The present existence of this clause
in the 1934 Act, to which the Williams Act is an amendment, 6' arguably im-
plies that Congress did not intend to preempt by occupying the field. Some
federal courts have construed the clause as explicitly recognizing the authority
of the states to regulate tender offers. 62 And, the Supreme Court itself has
concluded that section 28(a) "was plainly intended to protect, rather than
to limit, state authority. "63
A valid preemption analysis, then, depends upon whether the state regula-
tion poses some indirect conflict with the Williams Act by frustrating its pur-
poses and objectives. The Williams Act itself simply imposes certain minimal
disclosure requirements on the offeror. The state acts expand these disclosure
requirements, but are aimed at protecting the investor just like the Williams
Act requirements. 6 By giving incumbent management an advantage over
the offeror in the war for corporate control, however, the state's advance
disclosure requirements upset the policy of neutrality discussed in the Williams
Act's legislative history. 65
Analysis of that Act's legislative history, however, indicates that although
Congress expressly adopted a policy promoting a neutral stance between
management and offeror, this policy was only a by-product of the actual con-
gressional objective or purpose: full disclosure to protect the investor. 66 Thus,
while state regulations might alter this policy of neutrality, they do not con-
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
61. The Williams Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (amending 15 U.S.C.§ 78m and § 78n) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)(1970)). See E. ARANOW &
H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 67.
62. See -Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1035 (4th Cir. 1980).
63. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979). The hearing provisions of
both the general and the insurance takeover statutes permit state officials to decide upon the
fairness and adequacy of the tender offer. Most states empower administrators with authority
to block tender offers altogether. In Kidwell, the Fifth Circuit suggested this authority resulted
in a conflict between the state's fiduciary approach and the Williams Act's market approach.
See supra note 49. The appellate court argued that by preventing stock owners from making
their own investment decision under a market approach, the state's authority to hold hearings
was inconsistent with the federal Act's neutrality concept and thus was preempted. See Kidwell,
577 F.2d at 1276-78.
This conflict, if substantial enough to raise preemption issues, would implicate the constitu-
tionality of the state's authority to conduct "merit review" of securities transactions. For
.background discussion of merit review, see Goodkind, Blue Sky Laws: Is There Merit in the
Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 79. The Supreme Court, however, has implicitly re-jected such a drastic extension of the preemption doctrine, preserving some room for state authority
over securities regulation. See Leroy, 443 U.S. at 182 n.13. The precise extent of the state's
authority to determine whether a tender offer may proceed at all has not been addressed. And
the validity of merit review of the tender offer's fairness, while arguably inconsistent with Con-
gress' policy of neutrality, is beyond the scope of this Note. Although the Court's opinion in
Leroy impliedly preserves the state's authority to conduct hearings concerning the tender offer,
the effect of delay caused by those hearings is within the Edgar Court's reach of unconstitutionality.
64. See supra text accompanying note 21.
65. For a discussion of neutrality as a possible purpose of the Williams Act, see supra note 12.
66. For an extensive discussion of the legislative purpose behind the Williams Act, see supra
note 12.
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flict with investor protection and therefore should not be found invalid under
the supremacy clause.
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the idea that Congress intended
neutrality between offeror and management to be one of the major purposes
behind the Williams Act. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,67 the Court
explained that neutrality was merely a means to achieve the end goal and
sole purpose of the Williams Act, investor protection. 8 Thus, state takeover
regulations, which conceivably favor management through pre-offer disclosure
and delay, do not conflict with the purposes or objectives of the Williams Act."9
Federalism and Preemption
In Edgar, the majority did not rely upon preemption to find the Illinois
Act invalid. Considering the precise interpretation of the Williams Act's
legislative history, above, such nonreliance is technically correct. However,
this indicates more than a possible weakness in Justice White's preemption
analysis. The majority not only disagreed with White's reading of the Act's
legislative history, it felt that the congressional policy behind the Act would
be better applied in a commerce clause analysis. It is the position of this Note
that the Edgar Court desired to maintain a "restrained approach to
federalism," an attitude recently embraced by the Court when undertaking
preemption questions."'
67. 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (The Court addressed the issue of an unsuccessful offeror's standing
to sue the target's management for violating the Williams Act in defeating the offeror's takeover
bid).
68. Chief Justice Burger, in writing the opinion of the Court, stated:
Congress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for control,
but its policy of evenhandedness does not go either to the purpose of the legislation
or to whether a private cause of action is implicit in the statute. Neutrality is, rather,
but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the pro-
tection of investors. Indeed, the statements concerning the need for Congress to
maintain a neutral posture in takeover attempts are contained in the section of
the Senate Report entitled, "Protection of Investors." Taken in their totality, these
statements confirm that what Congress had in mind was the protection of
shareholders, the "pawn[s] in a form of industrial warfare." The Senate Report
expressed the purpose as "plac[ing] investors on an equal footing with the takeover
bidder," Senate Report 4, without favoring wither the tender offeror or existing
management. This express policy of neutrality scarcely suggests an intent.to confer
highly important, new rights upon the class of participants whose activities prompted
the legislation in the first instance.
Id. at 29-30.
69. See Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical Under-
pinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 733, 749-50 (1979). One commen-
tator has interpreted the legislative history of the Williams Act as allowing states to regulate
tender offers by any means as long as within the confines of the commerce clause. Such an
interpretation is consistent with the thesis that Congress' desire to avoid favoring either manage-
ment or offeror was distinct from the legislative intention to avoid imposing substantial federal
control over tender offers. This latter desire was the true intent of Congress and was achieved
through the neutrality mechanism. See infra text accompanying notes 103-06.
70. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 625 (1975).
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In cases since 1973, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a reluctance to
find state laws preempted when there exists no exclusive federal regulation
over "matters which are necessarily national in import.'" 1 Recent preemp-
tion cases indicate that the Court has adhered to a flexible concept of federal-
state relations, permitting. concurrent jurisdiction over certain matters where
Congress has not expressly manifested its intent to exert exclusive control.
And, where a conflict between concurrent regulatory schemes is peripheral
to the purpose of the statute, the state statute is not per se invalid under
the supremacy clause.7"
This "restrained federalism" concept may be applied to the Edgar preemp-
tion discussion. It is apparent that Congress did not clearly intend to preempt
state takeover statutes with exclusive jurisdiction in the Williams Act. And,
the conflict between the regulatory requirements, one allowing delay and the
other not, can be described as peripheral to the investor protection purpose.
But as the decision in Edgar demonstrates, the presumption favoring state
concurrent regulation extends only so far. The Court was confronted with
a congressional policy that gave the activity being regulated, tender offers
and cash takeover bids, a strong national import. The Edgar opinion can be
viewed as the Court's struggle to balance a restrained federalism with solicitude
towards state interests on one hand, and a congressional indication of an
activity as "necessarily national" on the other. As this Note's analysis of
Edgar's dual commerce clause grounds explains, this policy or "congressional
characterization" caused the scales to tip against the state's authority to regulate
tender offers.
Commerce Clause
The Edgar Analysis
Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor and Stevens agreed with Justice
White that the Illinois Act violated the commerce clause because it was a direct
restraint on interstate commerce. This direct restraint conclusion derived from
the Act's potential power to affect or block a nationwide sale of securities.
Two factors supported the finding that the statute's "sweeping extraterritorial
effect" 73 resulted in a direct restraint on commerce. First, the conditions for
the state law's jurisdiction did not create a sufficient legislative nexus between
the state and the parties it regulated.74 This due process component of the
71. See id. at 640.
72. See id. at 635-42.
73. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642.
74. In discussing the insufficient legislative nexus between Illinois and target corporations,
the Court said:
Indeed, the Illinois law on its face would apply even if not a single one of Chicago
Rivet's shareholders were a resident of Illinois, since the Act applies to every tender
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Court's commerce clause analysis was reflected in the use of Shaffer v.
Heitner" as authority: "any attempt 'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the in-
herent limits of the state's power. ' 76 Second, upholding the validity of the
Illinois statute would permit other states to impose similar regulations, thus
creating a cumulatively strong impediment to interstate commerce.
The four justices who found the Illinois Act to be a direct restraint on
commerce also found, with Justice Powell, that the Act's ability to block a
nationwide tender offer imposed burdens on interstate commerce which were
unduly substantial when weighed against the state interests served by the statute.
The Court examined general burdensome effects created by the statute's
national reach. These burdens were all based upon the economic usefulness
of tender offers and takeovers. 77 And, the insufficiency of the state's interests
in protecting investors and regulating Illinois corporations derived from two
sources. First, the insufficient nexus resulting from the extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion created interests beyond Illinois' power to regulate: nonresident
shareholder protection and the regulation of the internal affairs of foreign
corporations. Second, the protections afforded to resident shareholders were
speculative in light of the protections supplied by the Williams Act.
The actual opinion of the Court held that the Illinois Act was unconstitu-
tional under the Pike balancing approach because the economic burdens
outweighed the local benefits.7 8 The fact that four Of the five justice majority
also found the Act was a direct restraint on commerce, however, suggests
the Court's willingness to interfere in state economic regulation." Thus, to
analyze the constitutional scope of Edgar using simply the majority's balancing
-approach would be unrealistic. Several observations demonstrate a need to
go beyond this balancing analysis to delineate constitutional parameters
pertinent to state insurance takeover regulations.
offer for a corporation meeting two of the following conditions: the corporation
has its principal executive office in Illinois, is organized under Illinois laws, or
has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented in Illinois.
... Thus the Act could be applied to regulate a tender offer which would not
affect a single Illinois shareholder.
Id.
75. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
76. Id. at 197.
77.
The effects of allowing ... Illinois . . . to block a nationwide tender offer are
substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at
a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use,
a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive
the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well so
stock prices remain high is reduced.
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643.
78. See supra note 47.
79. See Teshnut, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wisc. L. REv. 125 and
Eule, supra note 45, at 426-27 (where the author discusses the increasing willingness of the Court to
invalidate state regulations under the commerce clause).
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A Desire for a More Sophisticated Analysis
Recent decisions in which the Court has reviewed the validity of state regula-
tions reveal underlying defects in the balancing test. First, the Court has
demonstrated that it is uncertain how to balance burdens against state in-
terests. One recent example of the Court's confusion in applying the balancing
test is Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.8" In Kassel, the Court
examined the constitutionality of an Iowa safety statute which prohibited the
use of 65-foot double trucks on Iowa highways. In deciding that the statute
impermissibly burdened interstate commerce under a balancing approach, a
plurality' of the Court found that the safety purposes asserted by Iowa were
speculative. The plurality based this finding on a belief that the factual trial
evidence did not show that the regulation contributed to highway safety.
Two justices concurred 2 in the Kassel plurality's conclusion that the state
safety regulation was "protectionist" in nature, but disagreed as to how the
balancing test should be applied. Rather than weighing the burdens against
factual evidence proving the statute's effectiveness in furthering safety interests,
the proper standard of review, argued the concurrence, was to "balance the
burdens imposed on commerce against the local benefits sought to be achieved
by the State's lawmakers." 3
The Court's ambiguous application of the balancing test creates doubt as
to what importance state interests really play in the constitutional evaluation
of state statutes. The Court's alleged deference to state interests is weakened
when one realizes it is virtually impossible to balance economic interests against
noneconomic interests. This "problem of balancing incommensurables"" is
most apparent in highway safety statute cases where a state's valid interests
in safe highways is weighed against a federal interest in the free flow of goods
in a national market.8 5
Despite the weaknesses and inconsistencies in the balancing approach, the
Court has increased its invalidation of state commercial regulations. Over the
past six terms, the Court has found state statutes unconstitutional in seven
80. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
81. The Kassel plurality included Justices Powell, White, Blackmun, and Stevens.
82. The two justices who concurred with the plurality in Kassel were Justices Brennan and
Marshall.
83. Kassel, 450 U.S. at 680 (emphasis added) (Brennan, J., concurring). Further, Justice
Brennan noted, "It is not the function of the court to decide whether in fact the regulation
promotes its intended purpose .... Id. (emphasis in original). See also Teshnut, supra note
79. at 141 where the author discusses the variations in the balancing test which the Court has used.
84. See generally Teshnut, supra note 79, at 144-45.
85. The Court itself has recognized this problem: "It is difficult at best to say that financial
losses should be balanced against the loss of lives and limbs of workers and people using the
highways." Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 139-40
1968). See also Kassel, 450 U.S. 662; Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978);
ibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
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out of ten cases where a state's authority to regulate has been in issue.8 6 It
would appear that, in reality, the Court is determined to limit strictly the
power of the states to regulate, paying little or no attention to state or local
interests.
The problems inherent in the Court's use of the balancing test do not imply
that the proper constitutional analysis is the plurality's direct-indirect approach.
As with the balancing approach, the "mechanical, uncertain" application of
the direct-indirect analysis prevents it from serving as an adequate measure
of constitutional scope. 7 Also, reliance upon the plurality's direct restraint
test would undermine the validity of many state laws previously assumed per-
missible under the commerce clause, including state environmental protection
statutes and local employment protection laws. 88 The uncertainties and in-
consistencies in these two approaches negate their usefulness. Consequently,
to delineate accurately the constitutional boundaries of Edgar, an analysis
more sophisticated than balancing or direct-indirect tests must be used.
Congressional Policy as a Basis for Commerce Clause Analysis
This Note hypothesizes that the limits of permissible state regulation under
the commerce clause depend upon how the Court characterizes the activity
being regulated. Some expression of congressional policy that the activity is
of national scope and importance provides the basis for the Court's label.
Should the Court perceive some congressional intent to maintain a dominant
federal interest in the activity, the state regulation affecting the activity almost
certainly will be invalidated. Thus, if the Court discovers some congressional
directive characterizing the activity as national in import, the Court's opinion
86. See generally Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (Iowa statute
generally prohibiting the use of 65 foot double trailer trucks within its borders); Lewis v. BT
Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (Florida statute prohibiting banks, trust companies, and bank
holding companies operating principally outside of Florida from owning local businesses pro-
viding trust or investment advisory services); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (Oklahoma
statute prohibiting transportation or shipment of minnows procured within the state for sale
outside state); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey law pro-
hibiting importation of most solid and liquid waste); Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
429 (1978) (Wisconsin regulation generally barring trucks longer than 55 feet from state highways);
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (North Carolina
statute prohibiting labeling of apple containers with any but U.S. grade); Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (Mississippi regulation permitting sale of milk in state
on a reciprocal basis). This rash of invalidation is extreme compared to the Court finding state
regulations valid only four times over the preceding 24 terms.
87. See, e.g., DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927). Justice Stone, dissenting,
described the direct-indirect test as an unreliable standard:
[W]hether the interfeence with commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too
mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from actualities, to
be of value. In thus making use of the expressions, "direct" and "indirect in-
terference" with commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to describe
a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which it is reached..
Id.
88. See Boehm, supra note 69, at 743-44, 753-54; L. TRIBE, supra note 44, § 6-12.
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may say state interests are important; but the actual constitutional parameters
of that decision will be very narrow, creating an almost insurmountable barrier
for the state to overcome.89
Modern Supreme Court decisions support the idea that congressional policy
declarations provide the primary foundation for the Court's adjudication of
state regulatory schemes. In Parker v. Brown,9 ° the Court rejected a com-
merce clause challenge to a state statute intended to promote a local economic
interest. California instituted a raisin crop proration program designed to
stabilize the marketing of that crop. The program required raisin producers
to sell and market a substantial part of their crop outside the state. Despite
ninety-five percent of the crop being poured into interstate commerce, the
Court held that the program was valid under the commerce clause because
such a regulation was supported by congressional policy as declared in two
federal statutes. 9' The Court reasoned that Congress, by its agricultural legisla-
tion, recognized the distressed economic situation towards which the state
regulation was aimed and therefore meant to permit California's encroach-
ment upon interstate commerce.92
The Court's curt treatment of a commerce clause challenge in Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit" is another example of the signifi-
cant role congressional policy plays in determining the constitutionality of
state regulation. In Huron the Court evaluated the application of the city's
smoke abatement ordinance to transport ships in light of the commerce and
supremacy clauses. The Court's opinion focused on the preemption claim,
which it rejected because of the "[c]ongressional recognition tht the prob-
lem of air pollution is peculiarly a matter of local concern." 9 The commerce
clause issue derived from the city ordinance's requirement that a transport
company must replace or alter the structure of its ships' boilers if the smoke
emitted from them exceeds certain maximum standards. The Court quickly
89. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 43 & n.10 (1980) (where the
Court noted the presence of federal regulation in refusing to find that local interests justified
the state statute).
90. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
91. These two federal statutes were the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 601
(1940) and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. § 1302 (1940).
92. The Parker Court recognized that there were possible conflicting interests between state
and national economic concerns; but which interests would prevail was determined by congres-
sional policy:
In comparing the relative weights of the conflicting local and national interests
involved, it is significant that Congress, by its agricultural legislation, has recognized
the distressed condition of much of the agricultural production of the United States.
... It thus appears that whatever effect the operation of the California program
may have on interstate commerce, it is one which has been the policy of Congress
to aid and encourage through federal agencies in conformity to [the two federal
statutes].
317 U.S. at 367-68.
93. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
94. Id. at 446.
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disposed of this challenge, apparently relying upon the congressional policy
characterizing air pollution as a nonnational activity.
Finally, the Court's commerce clause analysis in Exxon Corp. v. Governor
of Maryland95 indicates that in light of congressional silence as to the economic
importance of certain activities, the Court embraces a nonnational characteriza-
tion. A Maryland statute prohibited petroleum producers and refiners from
operating retail service stations in the state. The gasoline producers argued
that the statute caused a decrease in the total flow of goods in a nationwide
petroleum market. Because the cumulative effect of other states enacting similar
legislation would have been to hinder seriously a national market activity,
no state should have retained the power to regulate the retail market of
gasoline.
The Exxon Court rejected the national characterization espoused by the
petroleum producers. It reasoned that the statute was not directed towards
an interstate market activity, but towards particular "interstate firms, "96 a
subject not within the commerce clause's protective purview. In rejecting the
national market argument, the Court displayed its dependence upon some sort
of congressional directive as to the nature of the activity being regulated:
this Court has rarely held that the Commerce Clause itself preempts an
entire field from state regulation, and then only when a lack of natural
uniformity would impede the flow of interstate goods .... The problem
thus is not one of national uniformity. In the absence of a relevant con-
gressional declaration of policy ... we cannot conclude that the States
are without power to regulate in this area.9
Several policy reasons support the hypothesis that the Court, in reality,
pays little deference to state interests in light of a congressionally posited
national activity. First, when Congress does dictate policy, indicating its desire
to maintain dominant federal interests over certain areas, uniformity in regula-
tion is needed. The interests seeking such uniform regulation will be national
in scope. Actually allowing states to assert legitimate interests within a single
national activity would promote nonuniformity among the laws of the states. 98
Creating such a "crazy quilt" of state regulatory requirements over areas of
national concern undermines the goal of the commerce clause: to maintain
an "arena of free trade among the several states," 99 amounting to a virtual
"national common market."'0 0
Second, as is discussed below, it is arguable that the Court uses the balanc-
95. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
96. Id. at 127.
97. Id. at 128-29 (emphasis added).
98. See Id. at 128 (discussing the arguments espoused by the petroleum producer).
99. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
100. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977). The
Edgar Court recognized such a problem in paying deference to state interests: "interstate com-
merce in securities transactions would be thoroughly stifled" with many, individual state regula-
tions. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643.
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ing approach as a tool to justify its decisions and promote state-federal rela-
tions. There is little precedential value in analyzing state regulatory schemes
on a case-by-case basis.' 0' Examination of the factual record to determine
if the statute actually furthers the state's interests causes constitutional ad-
judication to depend upon courtroom trial techniques. 02 And, to analyze the
state's legislative intent behind a statute presupposes the existence of some
characterization against which to weigh the state interests. The Court's
ambivalence over how to apply the balancing approach demonstrates this tool's
inherent weakness.10 3
Congressional Policy, Commerce Clause, and Federalism
By designating an activity national in scope, congressional policy plays a
dominant role in Supreme Court evaluation of state regulatory authority. This
prevalence is reflected in the symbiotic relationship between commerce clause
adjudication and preemption analysis.
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal 4 demonstrates the intermingling of
the commerce clause and preemption doctrines. A local airport imposed a
curfew restricting times for takeoffs and landings in an effort to curb airport
noise. In a 5 to 4 decision the Court held that the statute was preempted
because of the "pervasive nature" of the federal scheme of federal regulation
of airport noise. 5 Yet, in arriving at this decision, the majority used com-
merce clause guidelines. These included a congressional determination that
the timing of takeoffs and landings was of national significance and that
nonuniform regulation by the potential enactment of many similar local statutes
imposed significant burdens on a national activity.'0 6
It is significant to note that the sole difference between the majority and
the dissent in Burbank is the dissent's disagreement with the majority's inter-
pretation of congressional intent. In its analysis of the history of the federal
aviation legislation, the dissent concluded that there was no clear and explicit
101. See Comment, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 98 (1981) discuss-
ing the use of Kassel in future commerce clause adjudication: "The inability of any opinion
to command a majority, and the plurality's failure to define the scope of its decision, seriously
limits Kassel's precedential value and makes it difficult to assess the constitutionality . . . of
state safety regulations generally." Id. at 98.
102. See Teshnut, supra note 79, at 161.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 80-88 (discussing the inherent defects in the balancing
approach).
104. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
105. Id. at 633.
106. [T]he pervasive control vested in E.P.A. and the F.A.A. [by Congress] under
the 1972 [Noise Control] Act seems to use to leave no room for local curfews or
other local control .... If we were to uphold the . . . ordinance and a significant
number of municipalities followed suit, it is obvious that fractionalized control
of the timing of takeoffs and landings would severely limit the flexibility of the
F.A.A. in controlling air traffic control.
Id. at 638, 639. See also supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
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congressional purpose to preempt. However, the dissent fully agreed with the
majority's use of federal directives to test the validity of state regulatory
schemes as it also invoked an analysis derived from the commerce clause.' 7
In many recent preemption cases the Court has taken a restrained approach
to federalism in an effort to maintain some sort of harmony between the federal
and state governments. 0 8 Finding a state regulation per se invalid under the
commerce clause, however, would undermine the goal of federalism. Therefore,
to demonstrate that it is promoting state-federal relations, the Court pur-
portedly takes into consideration staie interests. But, as this Note has
hypothesized, when Congress signals that the activity is of national import,
state interests are actually of little consequence. Congress might not expressly
state an intent to occupy the field conclusively or declare a single, clear pur-
pose in enacting legislation. Nevertheless, congressional policy describing the
activity as a national one is certain death for a state regulatory scheme.
As the following discussion demonstrates, such was the case in Edgar. Con-
gress did not declare any intent to occupy the securities field exclusively, but
did regulate a significant aspect of the national securities market through the
Williams Act. Consequently, the Court did not rely on preemption grounds
to invalidate the Illinois Act.' 0 9 Nevertheless, the Court's invalidation of the
state statute on commerce clause grounds was unequivocal.
Congressional Policy and the Edgar Court
The Williams Act and a National Securities Market
Congress embraced a neutral stance in its federal takeover legislation by
favoring neither the raiding offeror nor the target's management. Although
such a policy of neutrality was merely a by-product of or means to the goal
of investor protection, its known effect was to facilitate takeovers by prevent-
ing target management opportunity to build defenses against the raiding cor-
poration's offer." 0 Thus, Congress did express a federal interest in the positive
aspects of takeovers.'
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress, through the Williams
107. See Burbank, 411 U.S. at 643 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
110. The sponsor of the Williams bill, Senator Harrison Williams, offered support for the
tender offer mechanism during congressional debates:
There is no intention in any way to prohibit tender offers. As a matter of fact,
I think it might encourage them. Through this legislation people will have more
information, and will be able to accept a tender offer and sell their shares to a
group which may wish to obtain a controlling interest.
113 CONG. Rsc. 24,665 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813 (indicating that Congress considered the
results of tender offers beneficial to investors, primarily because it was an effective method for
ousting entrenched but inefficient management).
111. See Note, supra note 5, at 1169 (discussing the legislative history of the Williams Act:
"[1lt can be argued that an implied purpose of the Williams Act is to allow tender offers.").
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Act's desire for neutrality, intended to promote tender offers within certain
guidelines. Consequently, a state regulation that hinders such an activity in-
terferes with a matter of national scope and importance."' It has been argued
that the Court overstated Congress' sentiment for tender offers and that the
Williams Act's legislative history did not indicate a congressional desire to
promote that activity." 3 The inquiry more appropriate to this Note's analysis
of the constitutionality of state takeover regulations, however, is not what
Congress actually intended in enacting the federal legislation, but how did
and does the Supreme Court perceive and interpret signals from Congress.
Regardless of the exact congressional attitude towards tender offers, the fact
that Congress took a neutral stance by passing minimal regulation of tender
offers indicates that it wanted to permit a national market to operate
independently.
The securities market is a national system with most transactions crossing
state lines."' Congress has buttressed the dominant federal interest in main-
taining this national market by enacting the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975.' "1 Recognizing that individual, dispersed markets were "an important
national asset which must be preserved and strengthened,""I Congress enacted
the amendments."' This legislation created a federal scheme for a national
securities market by increasing the Securities and Exchange Commission's
authority to create, police, and maintain a central market system. Congres-
sional enactment of these amendments lends support to the idea that Con-
gress favors a national description of the tender offer activity.
Edgar and a Concern for a National Securities Market
All three grounds for the Illinois Act's unconstitutionality in Edgar were
based upon a national securities market characterization. This common basis
112. In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975), the Court stated:
The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders who are con-
fronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to respond without
adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering
party. . . .The Congress expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon
for management to discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of stock
which would create the potential for such attempts. Indeed, the Act's draftsmen
commented upon the "extreme care" which was taken "to avoid tipping the balance
of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takeover bid." . . . [Congress] also recognized "that takeover bids should not be
discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched
but inefficient management.
Id. at 58-59.
113. See Note, The Indiana Business Takeover Act, 51 IND. L.J. 1051, 1089-91 (1976).
114. See Note, supra note 10, at 920.
115. See generally Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance: The National Market
System for Securities, 75 COLuM. L. REv. 1233 (1975).
116. See id. at 1269 (citing congressional findings in considering the 1975 amendments).
117. Securities Act Amendments of 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-29. 89 Stat. 97 § 7 (1975) (amending
15 U.S.C. § 78k (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
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was evident in the preemption analysis in the three justice plurality finding
the Williams Act's neutrality policy frustrated by the state regulation." The
use of congressional policy to derive a national character for takeovers also
was evident in both commerce clause analyses. This common dependence was
indicated in three ways: condemning the act's extraterritorial reach, finding
harmful economic burdens created by the state statute, and almost summarily
rejecting legitimate state interests. These actions taken by the Court flowed
from its presupposition that the state statute affected the regulation of securities
in a national market.
In Edgar's direct restraint analysis, the plurality's reliance upon the "sweep-
ing extraterritorial effect," 1" 9 created by the insufficient *nexus between the
state and the target, indicated its adherence to a national market approach.
Such a dependence was achieved in three ways. First, the Court distinguished
between state "blue sky" laws, "affecting interstate commerce only
incidentally,"' 12 0 and state takeover acts, which potentially regulate out-of-
state securities transactions. Second, the plurality emphasized the potential
power of the act to block nationwide tender offers, which conceivably affected
only nonresidents. 121 And third, the plurality emphasized the disruptive effect
many nonuniform state takeovers regulations would have on the national
securities market. The interference with "interstate commerce in securities trans-
actions" 122 referred to by the plurality is analogous to the adverse effect many
local airport noise ordinances would have had on the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration's uniform control of air space in Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal.'23 This analogy to Burbank's preemption analysis strengthens the
argument that congressional policy lies behind all three Edgar grounds.' 2 1
The keystone of the majority's balancing analysis was the Illinois Act's
potential extraterritorial ability to block nationwide tender offers. Reliance
upon this rationale suggests that the burdens on commerce were imposed
against national economic interests. The Court determined that the burden-
some regulation caused three harmful effects to investors and the market,2 5
all founded upon the apparent assumption that pre-offer disclosure and delay
would virtually halt nationwide tender offers.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
119. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643.
120. Id. at 642.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74 and note 74.
122. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642.
123. See 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); see also supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
124. See generally Note, supra note 5, at 1165.
125. See Edgar, 475 U.S. at 644, and supra note 77. Commentators have supported the idea
that the takeover acts' ability to block tender offers is harmful to the economic market. Blocking
tender offers causes fluctuations in the securities market which result in a halt in trading, conse-
quently impairing national securities trading; blocking tender offers also discourages takeover
bids, thus allowing inefficient management to retain control and prohibiting investors from sell-
ing their stock at a premium. See generally Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation: Interests,
Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213, 238 (1975), and Note, supra note
5, at 1151.
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The majority based this economic evaluation upon congressional judgment
and analysis. 26 The overwhelming influence congressional directives and deci-
sions played in this instance of commerce clause adjudication is most poig-
nant when one realizes that the economic and behavioral effects of state
takeover laws are still open to debate.127 Commentators have acknowledged
the possible benefits accruing to investors from the pre-offer disclosure and
delay consequences of the state takeover regulations. ,28 These speculative ad-
vantages include creating in auction market, thus bringing into the open
offerors who will pay higher premiums to tendering shareholders,' 9 and
calming a panic atmosphere created by sudden tender offers, thus permitting
more rational, deliberate decisions beneficial to the entire marketplace.' 0
Also, empirical evidence indicates that state takeover statutes do not, in fact,
block or inhibit takeovers. Despite the delay caused by the statutes enacted
in thirty-seven states, the number of takeovers has continued to increase.",
Finally, it is argued that if state statutes do, in fact, block takeovers, the
legislation bestows a benefit on the economic market in the long run., 32 Because
better run corporations will be more attractive targets, a takeover might result
in replacing good management with inefficient management. Thus, the takeover
could cause the target corporation to lose some corporate independence without
injecting increases in synergistic value, productivity, or technical capability. 33
In its balancing analysis, the Edgar majority rejected Illinois' contention
that the takeover Act promoted two state-related interests. The Court rea-
soned that the protections afforded by the state regulation were speculative
or beyond the state's authority. This Note posits that because the Court em-
braced a national securities market characterization, any state interests pur-
ported to be protected by the takeover acts would be deemed "insufficient."
Illinois asserted that its interest in protecting target shareholders was suffi-
cient. Although this interest was certainly within the national securities market
approach, the protections provided on behalf of this interest were speculative
in light of the protections afforded by the Williams Act. Illinois also discovered
that asserting interests outside the Court's characterization was futile. Illinois
maintained that its interest in regulating an Illinois corporAtion's internal affairs
126. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 469-70.
127. See Comment, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HAgv. L. REv. 62, 69 (1982).
128. See MITE, 633 F.2d at 497-98. See generally McCauliff, Federalism and the Constitu-
tionality of State Takeover Statutes, 67 VA. L. Rav. 295, 306-09 (1981).
129. See McCauliff, supra note 128, at 307. See also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BER.-
STEIN, supra note 17, at 218-19.
130. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 17, at 218-19.
131. See Note, supra note 10, at 872 n.2. But see Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects
of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 371, 401 (1980)
(after rash of state takeover statute enactments in 1975-1977, frequency of cash takeovers had
declined in states with takeover acts).
132. See Liman, Has the Tender Offer Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv.
687, 707-08 (1978); Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation:
The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 722, 741-45 (1970).
133. See Liman, supra note 132, at 707.
[Vol. 59:255
INSURANCE TAKEOVERS
was legitimate. A state's authority to regulate such an interest embraces a
traditional corporate fiduciary law approach. 34 The majority alluded to this
impermissible incongruity by using the insufficient nexus rationale to dispense
with the state's second interest. The majority concluded that the Illinois Act
"applies to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and have their
principal place of business in other states. Illinois has no interest in regulating-
the internal affairs of foreign corporations."' 3
Although the Edgar Court found the nexus insufficient, commentators have
recognized that state takeover regulations may well be aimed at protecting
or promoting a state's noneconomic or corporate interests.' 36 These valid in-
terests include maintaining the quality of life within the state's borders, pre-
serving localized control and decision making responsibility of economic en-
tities, encouraging civic responsibility, and insuring management's fiduciary
obligations to shareholders."'
Thus, despite the existence of legitimate state interests, states find themselves
in a "Catch-22" situation under the Edgar balancing analysis. Any attempt
by a state to assert an interest that could be characterized as within the national
securities market would be invalid because protections beyond those provided
by the Williams Act would be "speculative," which is simply a less offensive
way of saying contrary to the congressional policy of neutrality. 13' And, assert-
ing interests unrelated to the securities market would also be futile for two
reasons. First, the nexus between the state and the targets would always be
deemed insufficient. Second, the overriding federal interest in a national
securities market would always cause the balance to tip against state interests.
In his concurrence Justice Powell expressed a concern with the adverse effects
of corporate takeovers on the general public interest." 9 Thus, he agreed only
with the Court's balancing analysis because its "reasoning leaves some room
for state regulation of tender offers."' 40 Such an interest in noneconomic con-
134. See Boehm, supra note 69, at 742; Shipman, supra note 132, at 740-43.
135. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 647.
136. See generally Boehm, supra note 69, at 743-46, 754-55, and Shipman, supra note 132,
at 741-45.
137. See generally sources cited supra note 136.
138. See Boehm, supra note 69, at 755.
139. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, stated, "there are certain adverse consequences
in terms of general public interest when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city
and State." 457 U.S. at 647 (Powell, J., concurring). In a footnote to his concurring opinion,
Justice Powell expressed his concern for non-economic interests:
The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporatidns
tend to be located in the large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters
are transferred out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, the
State and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly.
Management personnel-many of whom have provided community leadership-
may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable,
and educational life-both in terms of leadership and financial support-also tend
to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters.
Id.
140. Id.
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tributions to a local community, however, does not fall within the national
securities market approach relied upon by the Court throughout its decision.
Thus, just as Illinois did, Justice Powell ventured outside the Court's
characterization.
Justice Powell's emphasis on state interests and his refusal to rely on national
-securities market concerns is significant when one realizes his swing vote
marked the distinction between the majority and a plurality which ruled the
state act was a direct restraint on commerce. The relevance of his concern
over a state's authority to regulate tender offers is diminished by his asserting
a noneconomic interest outside the Court's national market approach, a move
which, when tried by the state, was rejected. Thus, the sincerity of the balan-
cing approach's solicitude towards state interests is cast into doubt. And the
gap between the direct restraint analysis and the indirect balancing analysis
is closed, creating a finding of unconstitutionality that is practically impossi-
ble for state takeover schemes to overcome.
The certainty of Edgar's finding of unconstitutionality is further evidenced
by the Court's willingness to base its reasoning upon speculative assumptions.
For instance, not only did the Court base its decision on arguable assump-
tions concerning the effects of state takeover statutes in general,'' but it readily
found the Illinois Act violative of the commerce clause despite the fact the
particular effects of the delay caused by the statute had not been established
by the trial court.'42 Additionally, in condemning the sweeping extraterritorial
effect caused by the insufficient nexus between the target and the state, the
Court indicated a willingness to find unconstitutional any statute that poten-
tially regulates out-of-state transactions affecting any nonresidents. The actual
nexus between the target and the state was irrelevant;'4 3 if the act remotely
affected out-of-state investors, it was invalid. And, because the Court did
not conclude the Illinois Act had in fact prevented tender offers, its decision
indicates that any potential power to do so would impose substantial burdens
on interstate commerce.
Several lower federal courts have recently relied upon Edgar to address the
unconstitutionality of other state takeover statutes.'" These courts have
recognized the Edgar decision's extremely narrow constitutional parameters,
finding takeover statutes of four individual states invalid on commerce clause
grounds. The hypothesis that these lower court decisions embraced the Supreme
141. See supra text accompanying notes 127-33.
142. See MITE, 633 F.2d at 498.
143. For instance, in the MITE Corporation situation, 27% of the target corporation's
shareholders, holding 43% of that company's stock, were Illinois residents. The 7th Circuit dis-
missed this substantial factual nexus as "fortuitous." See MITE, 633 F.2d at 501.
144. See, e.g., Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 51 U.S.L.W. 2427 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 1983); Esmark,
Inc. v. Strode, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) 1857 (Ky. S.Ct. Oct. 12, 1982); Televest, Inc.
v. Bradshaw, 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1795 (E.D. Va. Sept. 27, 1982); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 14 SEc. REG & L. REP. (BNA) 1793 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982); Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982); Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982).
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Court's national securities market rationale is supported by two observations.
First, four post-Edgar findings of unconstitutionality were based upon the
states' interference in the marketplace caused by the takeover laws. Second,
in at least two cases, the nexus between the state and the target corporation
was stronger than that created by the Illinois Act in Edgar.' 45 Yet, despite
the facts that state authority was limited only to state corporations and that
local shareholders constituted a major percentage of the total number of in-
vestors, the courts found the statutes invalid, thus relying upon speculative
burdens in a national securities market system.
Under the foregoing analysis, this Note has argued that despite the Edgar
Court's purported deference to state interests and concern for federal-state
relations, the opinion creates a very narrow constitutional area for permissible
state takeover regulations. Because Edgar applies only to state statutes
regulating the takeover of general corporations, however, it leaves uncertain
the constitutionality of state statutes regulating takeovers of financial institu-
tions such as banks and insurance companies. The decision did not preclude
the applicability of its reasoning to those specialized statutes.' 6 In Part III
this Note's foregoing constitutional analysis is used to examine the validity
of state insurance takeover acts under Edgar's narrow parameters.
III
Constitutional Problems
State insurance takeover statutes are directed towards dual objectives:
policyholder protection and shareholder protection.'4 Herein lies the constitu-
tional uncertainty surrounding the insurance takeover statutes. The protec-
tion of a domestic insurer's policyholders is clearly within a state's sphere
of authority and interest, especially in light of the McCarran-Ferguson Act," 8
which was passed by Congress to delegate to the states regulatory authority
over the business of insurance, including regulation free from commerce clause
restrictions.' 9 The requirements of the state insurance takeover statutes,
however, clearly parallel those unconstitutional elements of the general takeover
statutes.
145. See Esmark, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) 1857 (the Kentucky takeover act was found
invalid as causing an undue burden on interstate commerce despite over 50% of the target cor-
poration shareholders being Kentucky residents); Telvest, 51 U.S.L.W. 2427 (the Virginia act
was limited to Virginia corporations and 60% of the target shareholders were residents of the
state, thus imposing a lesser burden on commerce, yet the state act was found invalid under
a balancing analysis).
146. See Comment, supra note 127, at 67 n.35.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
148. See supra note 4.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 164-77 (discussing the McCarran-Ferguson Act's pur-
poses and scope of authority).
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The insurance takeover statutes provide protection only to insurers formed
under the laws of the state or nondomestic insurers authorized to do business
in the state. 50 Thus, it would seem that the state has a sufficient connection
with the corporations it is protecting to survive an Edgar commerce clause
analysis. However, this nexus between the state and the domestic insurer is
of little relevance when one realizes that the shareholders who own stock in
the insurance company are distinct from the owners of the insurance policies. 5 '
Thus, the owners of the insurance company stock are not necessarily residents
of the regulating state. If the statutes are described as shareholder protection
measures, then the insurance acts have the same potential "sweeping extra-
territorial effect" upon tender offers in the securities market as did the Ill-
inois Act in Edgar. Such a potential effect on a national securities market
is invalid.
The Edgar Court based its decision concerning the burdensome effects of
the Illinois statute on the pre-offer disclosure and delay consequences of the
Act.' 52 These consequences are arguably more burdensome in the insurance
statutes. The mandatory public hearing by the insurance commissioner leaves
no doubt that there will always be a considerable delay between the public
announcement of the intent to make a tender offer and the actual commence-
ment of the offer. And, the state's power to create delay is supplemented
by provisions that give the insurance commissioner absolute authority not
to approve the tender offer transaction. This approval depends on whether
the proposed takeover is detrimental to the security of the policyholders and
whether the tender offer is fair to the shareholders.' 53 The state has the power
to bring certain death to a tender offer, thus affecting shareholders outside
its borders and inhibiting transactions in a national securities market. Some
commentators have siezed upon the effects these insurance acts have on a
nationwide securities transaction, contending that they were, in reality, anti-
takeover measures using the hearing provision as a means to hinder the tender
offer objective.' 5
Four district courts have wrestled with the constitutionality of state insurance
takeover statutes. In National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., the District
Court for Western Missouri found parts of the Missouri Insurance Holding
Company Act invalid on two grounds. First, the administrative review pro-
cedures conflicted with the Williams Act's policy of affording investors the
opportunity to make their own decisions. Second, certain provisions imposed
excessive burdens on interstate commerce. The National City court invalidated
only those parts of the Act that created delay: the precommencement notifica-
150. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
151. See Kelley, Stocking a Mutual Insurance Company: The Regulatory Experience, 30 FED.
INS. Q. 29, 32-33 (1976).
152. See supra text accompanying note 77.
153. See supra text accompanying note 36.
154. See Clark, supra note 34, at 793.
155. 524 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
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tion requirement, the administrative hearing provision, and the offeror
disclosure requirement. Recognizing the distinction between investor protec-
tion and policyholder protection, the district court reasoned that although
the state did have a legitimate interest in protecting the state's insurers and
their policyholders, this objective could be accomplished through other parts
of the Act less burdensome to the market. The National City court concluded
that the state's interest in policyholder protection does not extend to the regula-
tion of securities.5 6 Thus, the court applied a securities market rationale to
certain parts of the act while recognizing an insurance policyholder protec-
tion approach for others."'
In Gunter v. Ago Internationa,'58 the northern Florida district court also
followed a securities market approach to find the Florida Insurance Holding
Company Act preempted by the Williams Act. Although it did not reach issues
arising under the commerce clause, the Gunter court based its invalidation
of the state statute upon the act's pre-offer disclosure and delay provisions.
More significantly, the court reasoned that the statute frustrated the "market
approach" of the Williams Act by impeding the effectuation of takeovers. 
5 9
Other courts, however, have not agreed with the reasoning of the Florida
and Missouri courts. In Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel,'6 1
the district court of Kansas held that the Kansas Insurance Holding Com-
pany Act was valid because the McCarran-Ferguson Act provided the statute
with blanket protection from commerce clause attacks. The court reasoned
that the state regulations protected the interests of Kansas insurance com-
156. "Since the [state's] interest in protecting policyholders does not extend to the regulation
of securities, the challenged sections of the Insurance Act pose a significant burden on com-
merce." Id. at 912.
157. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit examined the general Missouri takeover statute and the
state insurance takeover act. National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.
1982). The appellate court found the general takeover statute unconstitutional on two grounds.
First, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar, the Eighth Circuit found that because
the Missouri takeover act was not significantly different from the Illinois Act in Edgar, the Missouri
statute was invalid under the Edgar majority's commerce clause analysis. Id. at 1128. The ap-
pellate court went beyond the commerce clause ground, however, to find that the delay, addi-
tional disclosure, and discriminatory substantive requirements of the state Act disrupted "the
neutrality essential to the proper operation of the market approach of protecting investors utilized
by the Williams Act." Id. at 1133.
Unlike the district court, however, the Eighth Circuit did not address the substantive validity
of any provisions of the Missouri Insurance Holding Company Act. Instead, the appellate court
found that the insurance statute, which governed acquisition of control of domestic insurers,
was not applicable to the acquiring insurance company in this case because the target entity
was not engaged in the business of insurance as required by the statutory definition of domestic
insurer. Id. at 1134.
158. 533 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
159. Id. at 90. In discussing the Williams Act, the Gunter court said:
Congress recognized that tender offers often benefit investors: therefore, the Williams
Act was not designed to obstruct legitimate takeover bids. The law imposes neutrality,
among the contestants in a tender offer by requiring full and fair disclosure for
the benefit of investors while simultaneously providing the offeror and manage-
ment equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
Id. at 89.
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pany policyholders, thus falling within the federal Act's "business of in-
surance" protective umbrella. In drawing a distinction between policyholder
protection and shareholder protection, the court considered general takeover
statutes completely different from insurance takeover acts. The insurance acts
were not securities regulations measures and thus were not within the market
characterization. The general takeover statutes did fall into the market
rationale, however, because "they have a greater impact upon commerce
• . . than a law concentrating on insurance company transactions."' 6'
Finally, the constitutionality of the Idaho insurance takeover act was upheld
by the district court for Idaho in John Alden Life Insurance Co. v. Woods. 62
The Idaho court reasoned that by requiring scrutiny of the financial and
managerial reliability of the offeror, the state act focused on the relationship
between the insurance company and the policyholder. The act's primary con-
cern with this relationship qualified it for the McCarran-Ferguson Act's pro-
tection from commerce clause attacks.163
The varying opinions among these lower federal courts reflect the difficulty
in trying to analyze the constitutionality of state insurance takeover acts. The
decisions depict the struggle between two conflicting state interests created
by the statutes. Policyholder protection is a valid state interest under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act; shareholder protection is not a valid state interest
under the Edgar decision.
The state's interest in protecting policyholders requires scrutiny of an
offeror's financial condition. Attempts to balance this state interest against
the burdens imposed on an interstate securities market by the insurance acts
result in a confusing and unsupported analysis. Both concerns are distinct
in approach and importance. Balancing the conflicting objectives would be
tantamount to comparing apples with oranges.
Because the insurance acts and general takeover acts have almost the same
elements and effects, it is reasonable to conclude that the insurance acts fall
within Edgar's far reaching conclusion of unconstitutionality. However, this
would summarily label the acts as investor protection measures, disregarding
their policyholder protection function. A more careful constitutional analysis,
taking into consideration policyholder protection, examines whether there exists
some congressional policy which affirmatively excludes these insurance acts
from the Edgar Court's national securities market characterization. The lower
court cases reveal that this policy might be found in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's protection of the state's authority to regulate the business of insurance.
160. 528 F. Supp. 391 (D. Kan. 1981).
161. Id. at 408.
162. FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 98,617 (D. Idaho Dec. 19, 1981).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 190-91 (discussing what constitutes the "business of
insurance").
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The Unconstitutionality of Insurance Takeover Acts
The McCarran-Ferguson Act
The McCarran-Ferguson Act' 6 4 was enacted by Congress in direct response
to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Southeastern Underwriters
Association. 65 That decision centered around alleged conspiracies to fix in-
surance premium rates and agents' commissions. Members of an insurance
underwriters association allegedly used boycotts and other coercive methods
to compel noninsured persons to buy solely from association members. In
upholding the use of federal antitrust laws over the insurance industry, the
Supreme Court held that "insurance companies which conduct their activities
across state lines are within the regulatory power of Congress under the Com-
merce Clause." '166 The Court's decision cast doubt upon the authority of states
to regulate insurance companies, particularly the right to collect taxes. To
ensure the validity of such state authority and negate any idea that the in-
surance industry was under exclusive federal control, Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.16 7
By its terms, the Act reserves to the states power concurrent with that of
the federal government to regulate the "business of insurance." 168 Although
Congress limited the states' power to the "business of insurance," it left that
term undefined. Of central importance to this Note's constitutional analysis
is whether Congress intended to permit states to regulate in areas of over-
riding federal concern.
A general analysis of the Act's legislative history offers little guidance in
164. 59 Stat. 34 (145) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976)).
165. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531,
538-39 (1978).
166. Southeastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 535.
167. The Act provides in relevant part:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
states of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on
the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regula-
tion or taxation of such business by the several states....
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be sub-ject to the laws of the several states which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such business.
(b) NQ Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supercede
any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948 the... Sherman
Act, and the ... Clayton Act, and the ... Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by state law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976) (emphasis in original).
168. Id. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, states may enact legislation regulating the business
of insurance without federal laws invalidating, impairing, or superceding such state acts.
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discovering any areas especially reserved to state authority. In hastily drafting
and enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress did not allude to any
specific interests or activities which might fall under the "business of
insurance." '69 And, it is unlikely Congress considered the relationship between
a federal securities market and the "business of insurance" when it passed
the Act, as cash takeover bids and tender offers were phenomena of the
1960's."7° Thus, insurance takeover regulation was probably not within Con-
gress' original grant of authority to the states, whatever that grant contained.
Commerce Clause Limitations: A Concern for a Free Market
In permitting the states to regulate the business of insurance, Congress im-
posed one major limitation upon state authority. The McCarran-Ferguson Act's
legislative history suggests that Congress sought to maintain a dominant federal
interest in a national free market, expressly limiting the states' power to enact
legislation affecting interstate markets. Such a limitation is evident on two
grounds.
First, Congress expressly provided that state authority to regulate insurance
practices did not extend to activities having extraterritorial effects.'' This
authority was appropriately limited by the commerce clause."' Consequent-
ly, states were restrained by commerce clause considerations when regulating
the "business of insurance."''
Second, congressional concern in passing the Act focused on state authority
to tax the insurance industry and to regulate insurance policies. Debates over
the McCarran-Ferguson bill centered on reconciling the powers of the states
to tax insurers with the applicability of federal antitrust laws to the insurance
industry."" Ultimately it was decided that the Act was not intended to defeat
169. See Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 9 n.5 (1977); Reich, Reapprais-
ing the State-Federal Regulation of Insurance, 13 FORUM 867, 871 (1978).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 164-69.
171. See 91 CONG. REc. 1483 (1945).
172. Id.
173. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1945), the Supreme Court
construed the Act broadly to perceive one congressional purpose behind its enactment: complete
insulation of existing as well as future state regulation of the insurance industry from commerce
clause challenges. See also Barry, 438 U.S. at 539 and Western and Southern Life Insurance
Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648 (1981). This judicial perception
inaccurately presupposed that the parameters of permissible state regulation and the definition
of the "business of insurance" had been precisely established. As this Note suggests in Part
III, however, whether certain activities, such as transactions involving insurance company securities,
fall within the scope of the "business of insurance" is not clear. If an activity is within this
definition, one may assume state regulation of it would not be subject to commerce clause
limitations.
174. Debates in the Senate focused on potential state authorization of attempts to monopolize
resulting from the Act's grant of concurrent power. House debates expressed concern over the
coercion or intimidation of small insurers by large companies which enter into rate fixing
agreements. Senate debate over the conference bill indicated that while Congress intended for
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the purpose of federal antitrust legislation by inhibiting competition in a free,
national market.I" If such free market concerns are extended, it is plausible
to infer that Congress sought to prohibit states from imposing limitations
upon activities of national scope and importance. 76 Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act's unique grant of authority theoretically permits the states as
well as Congress to regulate, this concept of concurrent authority is illusory.
Congressional determinations of national activities under exclusive federal con-
trol through the commerce clause limit the actual scope of state power.."
The Supreme Court recognized a national market limitation in delineating
activities within a state's regulatory ambit in F.T.C. v. Travelers Health
Association.'I" A health insurance company mailed advertising materials into
neighboring states. Although such mailings were regulated by the laws of the
insurer's state, the Federal Trade Commission maintained that the insurer's
activities constituted interstate commerce. Therefore, they were subject to the
FTC's authority. In language resembling the Court's Edgar opinion, the
Travelers Health Court expressed concern with one state's attempt to regulate
an extraterritorial activity at the expense of federal jurisdiction over the
activity.'79 In interpreting the McCarran-Ferguson Act's legislative history,
the Court emphasized that section 2(b) of the Act did not authorize the state
to regulate extraterritorial activities. Congress intended state regulation of in-
surance to be limited to activities within that state's border.'8 0 The Court held
that the interstate mail order insurance business was not within the Act's protec-
tion of state insurance regulation.
insurance companies to be exempt from federal antitrust legislation, the Act was not to be used
to endorse attempts by a group of insurers to monopolize through rate fixing agreements. See
generally 91 CONG. REc. 479, 1087, 1443 (1945); Barry, 555 F.2d at 9-1 (presenting comprehen-
sive discussion of the Act's legislative history).
175. During Senate debates, Senator Mahoney pointed out that allowing certain coercive
agreements among groups of insurers would "invade the field of Congress to regulate commerce."
91 CONG. REc. 1485 (1945).
176. See Comment, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HA.v. L. REv. 255 (1969). In Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954), the Supreme Court extended such congressional free
market concerns by refusing to give effect to state insurance regulation that would "seriously
undercut congressional legislation in an important area of federal control." Id.
177. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 547, 556 (1947) (criticizing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, labeling the Act's grant of authority as a concept of "co-ordinated action").
178. 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
179. "[W]e are asked to hold that the McCarran-Ferguson Act operates to oust the [Federal
Trade] Commission of jurisdiction by reason of a single State's attempted regulation of its
domiciliary's extraterritorial activities. But we cannot believe that this kind of law of a single
State takes from the residents of every other State the protection of the ...Commission."
Id. at 297-98.
180. Citing the Act's legislative history, the Court noted that the three Senate conferees, in-
cluding the bill's two sponsors, "repeatedly emphasized that the provision did not authorize
state regulation of extraterritorial activities. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REC. 1481-83, 1484." F.T.C.,
362 U.S. at 301.
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The Dominant Federal Interest in
Insurance Securities Regulation
This extraterritorial limitation of the state's power to regulate insurance
extends directly to insurance regulation in the securities market. A state's
general authority to regulate securities is prohibited if such regulation would
encroach upon an important national activity."8 ' The Supreme Court has not
recognized any congressionally mandated exception to this Note's general con-
clusion when states attempt to justify securities regulation with the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. The following discussion of recent decisions indicates the nar-
row parameters of the states' particular authority when the national securities
market is even tangentially involved.
In SEC v. Variable Annuity Insurance Co.,"82 the Court narrowly defined
the concept of insurance over which state regulatory authority is controlling.
The Court held that "insurance" embraces the idea that the insurer take in-
vestment risks. The SEC sought to enjoin annuity insurers from offering their
variable annuity policies 83 to a public market without registering them with
the Commission. Arguing that the states have exclusive authority to regulate
such transactions as "insurance," the annuity insurers maintained that re-
quiring them to comply with federal securities legislation would supercede the
state's authority under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Court rejected this
argument, noting that variable annuities placed all risks on the policyholder
and not on the insurer. This placement of risk caused' the insurance policies
to fall outside the state's authority over "insurance" and within the authority
of the federal securities commission.
Thus, the Court has narrowed the state's regulatory ambit under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act."' The Variable Annuity decision supports this Note's*
thesis that when a national securities market interest is involved, the state's
power over the "business of insurance" will be limited, not expanded.6 5 This
constriction of a state's authority over insurance applies to state regulation
of the transformation of an insurance company's corporate structure, which
brings into play the conflict between territorial limitations on the state's power
to affect a national market system and the state's interests in protecting
policyholders.
In American General Life Insurance Co. v. F. T. C.,'86 the District Court
of Southern Texas examined the state's power to regulate the merger of a
181. See supra text accompanying notes 112-25.
182. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
183. For a definition of "variable annuity" see id. at 69.
184. See also United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (where the Court
held that a flexible fund annuity contract was a security and therefore subject to the SEC registration
requirements).
185. See Mearns, The Commission, The Variable Annuity, and the Inconsiderate Sovereign,
45 VA. L. REV. 831 (1959), "Whatever else the case of SEC v. Variable Annuity ... decided,
it settled the question that federal agencies could take a hand in the regulation of insurance." Id.
186. 359 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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life insurance holding company and a commercial property insurer. In oppos-
ing the FTC's authority over such a transformation, the holding company
contended that the McCarran-Ferguson Act granted to the states exclusive
power to regulate insurance company mergers. The district court rejected this
argument, reasoning that Congress did not give to the states any exclusive
authority over mergers when the impact of that corporate transformation would
be felt in the national market. The American General court relied upon the
Supreme Court's Travelers Health decision in imposing such extraterritorial
limitations on the state's authority over mergers.
The Narrow Concept of the "Business of Insurance"
The American General court also examined whether merger activities con-
stituted the "business of insurance" within the McCarran-Ferguson Act's grant
of authority. In concluding that the state's control over the "business of in-
surance" did not extend to mergers, the district court relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in SEC v. National Securities, Inc."7
The National Securities Court confronted the issue of conflicting objec-
tives, shareholder protection and policyholder protection, in a state scheme
regulating the transformation of insurance companies' corporate structure.
An Arizona statute required that a merger between two insurance companies
be approved by the state. Arizona approved a merger between National
Securities and Producers Life Insurance Company under two statutory re-
quirements: that the merger be fair to the insurer's shareholders, and that
the merger not reduce the policyholders' security. In seeking injunctive relief
to undo the merger, the SEC brought suit, alleging that National Securities
violated section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act '88 by making
fraudulent misstatements and omissions of material fact in securing the ap-
proval of Producers' shareholders to merge with the defendant company.
The Court recognized the supremacy of state law in regulating the "business
of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 8' The Court, however, nar-
rowly construed the "business of insurance" concept to include exclusively
activities that focus on the relationship between the insurer and the
policyholder, the type of policy which could be issued, and that policy's
reliability, interpretation, and enforcement. This included selling and adver-
tising policies, licensing insurance companies and their agents, and fixing
rates."' Thus, the states' authority to regulate the "business of insurance"
is limited to regulating a relationship involving the insurance contract.
The National Securities Court concluded that mergers did not fall within
the narrow "business of insurance" concept. Therefore, the SEC had the
187. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
188. 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
189. See National Securities, 393 U.S. at 459.
190. See id. at 460.
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authority to undo the fraudulently induced merger. And, by imposing local
control over insurance companies engaged in a corporate securities activity,
the state was improperly regulating in an area of national scope and import:
In this case, Arizona is concerning itself with a markedly different set
of problems. It is attempting to regulate not the "insurance" relation-
ship, but the relationship between a stockholder and the company in which
he owns stock. This is not insurance regulation, but securities regulation.
It is true that the state statute applies only to insurance companies. But
mere matters of form need not detain us. The crucial point is that here
the State has focused its attention on stockholder protection; it is not
attempting to secure the interests of those purchasing insurance policies.
Such regulation is not within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 9'
The issue confronted by the Court was not whether allowing the SEC to
exercise authority conflicted with state law. Rather, the issue was whether
the federal Act's grant of authority to the states was so complete as to dominate
federal policies of fair treatment and total disclosure in securities market
trading. The Court implicitly considered whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act
manifests some congressional policy that would exempt the effects of a state
regulatory action from the supremacy of federal interests, '92 but held that
"the McCarran-Ferguson Act furnishes no reason for refusing the remedies
the Commission is seeking. ' 93
The Court found that undoing the merger did not undermine the substan-
tive aims of the Arizona statute, policyholder and shareholder protection. Con-
sequently, the state's authority to approve mergers under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was not impaired.' 9 In reality, however, by permitting the federal
securities agency to have the relief it sought under the 1934 Act, the Court
disregarded Arizona's authority to approve the merger. In so doing, the Court
reaffirmed the importance of a federal interest in protecting the autonomy
of investors to make decisions based on minimal information. 9 The National
Securities decision indicates that the prevalent federal interest in securities
regulation is not to be diminished or sacrificed in favor of state protection
of policyholders under the McCarran-Ferguson Act." 6 Thus, in its analysis
191. Id. at 463.
192. The Court stated: "The question is, then, whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars a
federal remedy which affects a matter subject to state insurance regulation ... we do not think
it does." Id. at 462.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. The Court's attitude favoring investor autonomy is derived from its adherence to the
"market theory approach." See supra note 49. Congress embraced such an approach when it
enacted the Williams Act. See 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967). This approach is an integral part
of the Court's adjudication based upon a national securities market characterization.
196. The Court put the federal interest on equal footing with the state interest:
The paramount federal interest in protecting shareholders is in this situation perfectly
compatible with the paramount state interest in protecting policyholders. And the
remedy the Commission seeks does not affect a matter predominantly of concern
to policyholders alone: the merger is at least as important to those owning stock
as it is to those holding policies.
393 U.S. at 463.
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of the Act's purpose and powers, the Supreme Court perceived no congres-
sional policy creating a state interest exception to the national securities market
characterization. Without this congressionally mandated exemption, a state's
interest in policyholder protection is not sufficient to survive Edgar's per-
vasive finding of unconstitutionality.
The National Securities Court concluded that regulating the transfer of stock
in a merger was not within the state's "business of insurance" ambit. 97 Rather,
the insurance merger activity is within the national securities market
characterization. It is arguable, however, that the Court's analysis in National
Securities is to be narrowly construed to apply only to the state regulation
of mergers. This Note's final inquiry examines whether tender offers for the
takeover of insurance companies are distinguishable from the merging of two
insurance companies. If a significant distinction is found, it is possible that
the tender offer activity in the insurance industry is within a state's "business
of insurance" authority and not within a national securities market concept.
Mergers and takeovers through tender offers both involve some movement
of securities resulting in a transformation of the corporate structure. This
transformation has some impact on the financial stability of the insurance
corporation which, in turn, affects its ability to provide security to its
policyholders.' 98 There are distinctions between the two activities, however,
which arguably indicate a more urgent need for policyholder protection
measures in the tender offer. Theoretically, mergers entail negotiations be-
tween the managements of the consolidating companies. These discussions
examine whether the merger would be beneficial to policyholders and
shareholders of both corporations.
On the other hand, takeovers through tender offers involve no manage-
ment negotiations or deliberations. Without state insurance takeover regula-
tion, an offeror would be free to try to acquire control of the target insurer
through a surprise tender offer and quick purchase of securities. 99 In most
cases, management of the acquiring corporation does not negotiate with
management of the target. The betterment of the insurer's stability is not always
the goal of the tender offer maneuver. Rather, robbing the target insurer's
liquid assets could be the motive behind the raiding corporation's tender
offer. 20 Thus, compared to mergers, takeovers through tender offers are con-
ceivably more dangerous to the target insurer's financial stability and ability
to write and cover policies. 21'
Lawmakers and commentators, however, have made no distinction between
197. See supra text accompanying note 191.
198. See Comment, Insurance Companies-Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws-
Conflict with the McCarran Ferguson Act, 20 CASE W. Rts. 883 (1969) (discussing that mergers
affect the ratio of assets to contingent liabilities, determining the insurer's solvency).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
201. This danger is reflected in the heightened responsibility of target management to scrutinize
offerors in takeover attempts. See Levi, The Contested Acquisition of an Insurance Company
From the Target's Point of View, 17 FoRUM 212 (1981).
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the two activities. 20 2 While separate in state statutory schemes, laws regulating
both were enacted with the same objectives in mind: to protect policyholders
and shareholders by preventing corrupt management from depleting liquid
assets for non-insurance purposes. 20 3 Both groups, shareholders and
policyholders, needed substantial protection from two unfair practices of the
insurance holding company phenomenon: conglomerates acquired insurers to
use their assets for non-insurance activities, and insurance companies merged
to use the combined assets for future non-insurance related acquisitions. 204
Finally, despite the rubric of management negotiations, financial insolvency
and inability to underwrite or cover policies are possible consequences of the
merger activity as well as the tender offer activity. 2"'
Thus, although tender offers may present a greater need for policyholder
protection than do mergers, it is doubtful such a speculative difference would
be sufficient to transcend the federal interest in a national securities market.
This observation is supported by the judiciary's consistent deference to this
prevalent federal interest in cases involving the securities of insurance com-
panies. No lower federal court has held any provision of the federal securities
laws inapplicable because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's grant of state
authority." 6
Additionally, the Supreme Court has confirmed its narrow view of a state's
authority under the McCarran-Ferguson Act when such authority is exerted
in a securities market activity. In Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal
Drug Co.,2 1 the Court elaborated upon the scope of its National Securities
decision, stating, "[i]f a merger between two insurance companies is not the
'business of insurance,' then an acquisition by an insurer of a manufacturer
. . . is also not the 'business of insurance." ' 2 08
Finally, Congress has enacted legislation which reflects its intent that tender
offers for insurance company stock is a federal activity, not an insurance
activity reserved to the states. 2 9 Insurance companies were exempt from the
registration requirements of the 1934 Act and, therefore, were not protected
by the Williams Act when it was enacted in 1968. Offerors were not required
to file a disclosure statement with the SEC or target corporation when the
target of such a takeover bid was an insurance company. Prompted by a series
202. See generally, Schwing, supra note 30; Note, supra note 7.
203. See Note, supra note 7, at 654, 656.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 657-58.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Meade, 179 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Ind. 1960) (brokering of securities
not within the "business of insurance").
207. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
208. Id. at 216 n.13. The Royal Drug case held that agreements between insurers and retail
pharmacies to fix drug prices did not "relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers" to
fall within the business of insurance. Consequently, the agreements were not exempt from federal
antitrust laws, despite their being made to improve the insurer's ability to meet its obligations
to its policyholders.
209. See Note, The Federal Securities Code, 7 CONN. L. REv. 711, 714-17 (1975).
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of insurance company takeovers, the insurance industry urged Congress to
include insurance securities within the Act's protection. 210 Congress did so
in its 1970 amendments to the Williams Act. 2"' Thus, target insurance
stockholders confronted with a tender offer were protected by disclosure re-
quirements of the federal tender offer legislation. 212 Congress explicitly pro-
vided that the takeover of an insurance company is an activity of national
scope, strengthening the presumption against the state's vested involvement
in this activity.
CONCLUSION
Edgar v. MITE is hardly an example of judicial unanimity or clear prece-
dent. It is a frustrating task to interpret and apply signals from the Supreme
Court when it renders many opinions in one decision, none of which form
a strong majority. Consequently, to realize any utility and predictability from
such a decision, one must attempt to discern some ground common to the
reasoning of all the viewpoints expressed by the Court.
Admittedly, this Note has taken interpretive liberty in its model of con-
stitutional adjudication. In examining the validity of one narrow form of state
legislation in light of the invalidity of another more general statute, this Note's
analysis leaps from fragmented opinions to one rationale. Reflected in all issues
addressed by the Edgar Court, however, is the primacy of a national market
concern embodied in the congressional directives of the Williams Act. Despite
the different policy concerns, protected interests, and possible origins of
authority distinguishing the general takeover acts from insurance acts, both
have adverse effects on the national securities markets. In the absence of explicit
countervailing congressional policies excluding such insurance regulation from
the broad sweep of concerns expressed in Edgar, this Note concludes that there
is a presumption that state insurance takeover statutes are unconstitutional.
CHRISTOPHER KEELE
210. See Note, supra note 209, at 716.
211. Pub. L. No. 91-567 (Dec. 22, 1970), 84 Stat. 1497 (1970), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1980)
(known as the 1970 Amendments).
212. See Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAW.
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